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Recent research has developed and tested a theoretical framework for analysing 
the macro and micro economic effects of temporary positive external trade 
shocks in small open developing economies (Bevan et al., 1990). The findings, 
termed ‘construction boom theory’, suggest that the extent to which a boom’s 
transient windfall income is converted into a permanent income gain depends 
upon the savings responses of the public and private sectors and their ability to 
allocate savings among different fixed and financial assets. The nature of the 
economic policy regime plays a crucial role. An extensive system of controls 
over prices, interest rates, imports and foreign asset purchases is likely to induce 
a sub-optimal allocation of the windfall resources and to depress rates of return 
to saving and thus permanent income gains. Moreover, an inappropriate 
macroeconomic policy response during the boom (especially an excessive 
expansion of public spending, rapid growth of the money supply and an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate) may have very serious adverse 
consequences for external and internal macroeconomic imbalances during andor 
following the end of the boom. Macroeconomic problems include excessively 
large construction booms, declining tradeables output, over-extended public 
sectors, unsustainable public deficits, overvalued exchange rates and inflation. 
Many of these problems ultimately contributed to the need for the structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) which have been under way in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa for well over a decade. The aim of this article is to assess 
these SAPs from the standpoint of whether the reforms have left adjusting 
countries in a better position to manage temporary positive external trade shocks 
or commodity price booms in three important respects: diversifying the 
economy; efficiently saving and investing boom income; and appropriately 
managing the macroeconomy in the face of a positive trade shock. 
The construction boom literature is intended to be applicable to what are 
termed ‘controlled open economies’, the pertinent features of which are their 
openness to international trade, the extensiveness of government controls over 
private sector economic activity, and their reliance on a small number of 
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primary commodities for foreign-exchange earnings. It is arguable that most 
SSA economies can be (or could have been) characterised in this manner.’ 
Primary commodities accounted for 89% of the SSA region’s total export 
earnings in 1990 (UNCTAD, 1993a: 99). Of the 28 SSA countries classified by 
UNCTAD as ‘least developed countries’, 18 relied on a single commodity for 
at least 50% of their total export earnings (UNCTAD, 1993c: A-16 to A-19). 
Most SSA countries are price takers on world markets for their primary 
commodity exports, and these prices display far greater short-term instability 
than do the prices for non-primary tradeable commodities (Kaldor, 1987; 
Maizels, 1987 and 1992). Short sharp peaks in commodity prices are 
interspersed between longer but shallower troughs, and these fluctuations 
influence the economies of the SSA exporters through a number of crucial 
channels. Export earnings are the major determinant of the availability of 
imported inputs and hence the economy’s aggregate supply schedule. Aggregate 
demand is also likely to be sensitive to the prices received for commodity 
exports. Export earnings may influence a country’s foreign creditworthiness. 
Finally, the government revenue base is generally heavily dependent upon taxes 
levied on exports andor imports, so that the budget deficit is vulnerable to 
changes in the value of export earnings.* 
CBT and the macroeconomic effects of construction booms 
Construction boom theory (CBT) is an extension of the open economy 
macroeconomics known as Dutch Disease theory, which examines the impacts 
of permanent changes to the external trading opportunities facing an economy 
which directly increase permanent income (Corden, 1984; Neary, 1984; van 
Wijnbergen, 1984). In contrast, CBT deals with short-term changes to the 
external trading environment which tend to characterise primary 
commodity-producing economies and which increase transient rather than 
permanent income (such as the temporary commodity price boom in the second 
half of the 1970s). The transitory nature of these shocks has two important 
implications. First, CBT argues that the major effects of transitory income gains 
are normally higher levels of saving and investment. Secondly, whereas Dutch 
Disease theory is conducted mainly within the framework of comparative statics, 
1.  This description is not time-invariant, especially as most SSA countries which have 
implemented SAPS during the 1980s and early 1990s have made efforts to reduce and/or 
dismantle substantial elements of their control regimes in line with the market-liberalising 
strategy of these programmes. 
2. Trade taxes contributed nearly 43% of total tax revenues in a sample of 25 SSA countries 
in 1982 (Shalizi and Squire, 1988: 3). 
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the analysis of temporary commodity price booms involves consideration of the 
dynamic adjustment to a rise and then fall in transitory income. 
Construction booms and Dutch Disease are also characterised by different 
expectational properties. A permanent Dutch Disease shock gives rise to 
exclusive revised expectations of permanent income; permanent income 
increases because of the expectation of higher income in the future which had 
not been expected prior to the shock. By contrast, the temporary positive 
terms-of-trade shock that leads to a construction boom is generally characterised 
by exclusive unrevised expectations; this is an unexpected shock which is 
recognised as temporary and thus does not lead agents to revise their 
expectations of future commodity prices. Permanent income does rise but only 
by an amount equivalent to the sustainable income flow which can be generated 
by investing the trade windfall, i.e. the long-run rate of return to saving. Given 
that the windfall is recognised as having only limited effects on permanent 
income, most of it will normally be saved. 
During a construction boom investment will be influenced via two channels: 
the transient income or savings effect; and the permanent income or 
consumption effect. Under the former, windfall transient income is saved. This 
will cause a fall in the cost of investment funds andor an increase in the 
quantity of credit available, so boosting investment. To the extent that the 
additional investment has a positive rate of return, permanent income will be 
perceived to increase which will induce a rise in consumption. This will force 
up both demand for and prices of non-tradeable consumption goods, as in Dutch 
Disease, with this relative price effect encouraging investment in the non-traded 
goods sector. 
The increased investment brought about by both the transient and the 
permanent income effects of the positive terms-of-trade shock will increase the 
demand for capital goods. Tradeable capital goods will be imported, whilst 
excess demand for non-tradeable capital goods will force up their price and 
draw resources into this sector. Since it largely consists of construction 
activities, the upshot will be a construction boom. CBT therefore predicts an 
increase in the relative price of non-traded capital goods, with a sharp rise at the 
start of the boom followed by a gradual decline as the expansion of supply 
reduces excess demand. 
During the boom, when the prices of non-tradeable capital goods are being 
forced up so reducing returns to investment, it makes sense to defer fixed 
investment and instead build up financial assets, which can be run down later 
to fund fixed investment when non-tradeable capital goods prices have 
~ubsided.~ This spreads the investment boom beyond the trade shock and will 
moderate the rise in the price of non-tradeable capital goods and therefore 
3. This might be difficult to achieve if investors expect future capital goods prices to rise and 
so try to cram fixed investment into the immediate period. 
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prevent the marginal efficiency of investment falling too rapidly. If private 
agents are deterred from acquiring financial savings, transient income will be 
either invested prematurely in fixed capital or possibly used to purchase 
consumption goods; in either case the rate of return to saving will fall and the 
permanent income gains from the trade boom will be reduced. A key issue is 
whether the government control regime permits the above rational response to 
a temporary positive terms-of-trade shock. 
Government controls could prevent the accumulation of financial assets 
through two mechanisms. First, foreign-exchange controls may prevent the 
direct purchase of foreign assets by private agents. Second, nominal interest-rate 
controls and other restrictions on financial markets may depress the real rate of 
return available on domestic financial assets. 
Import restrictions are also likely to distort the efficient allocation of boom 
income. Under a highly restrictive regime the increased demand for tradeable 
capital and consumer goods will drive up their prices (they will become 
effectively non-tradeable at the margin). Unless there is substantial excess 
capacity and unemployment, the only way in which increased demand can be 
accommodated is by a transfer of resources from the export sector. Non-boom 
exports will experience adverse relative price movements during a boom and it 
is possible that even the boom export sector will suffer from a fall in the 
internal terms of trade. The improvement in the current account brought about 
by the transient foreign-exchange earnings should therefore allow import 
restrictions to be liberalised to some extent during a trade boom. 
Given that the optimal response to a trade boom involves an expansion 
followed by a contraction of the non-traded capital goods sector, accompanied 
by offsetting movements in other sectors of the economy, policies which 
discourage factor and resource mobility are likely to be an impediment to the 
efficient use of boom income. Such policies could include: controls on the 
import of construction materials or public sector monopolies on their production 
or supply; sectoral credit and foreign-exchange allocations; industrial and 
investment licensing; restrictions on foreign direct investment; and wage and 
price controls. 
The trade boom will affect the exchange rate, the money supply and inflation. 
The supply of foreign exchange to the economy will rise during the boom. 
Agents will exchange this for domestic currency which is used to purchase 
capital and consumer goods. Under a fixed exchange-rate regime there will be, 
cereris paribus, a balance-of-payments surplus and a rise in the money supply. 
The latter will lead to higher rates of domestic inflation, unless sterilised by the 
Central Bank, and to an appreciation of the real exchange rate: Under a flexible 
4. These outcomes will be greater if institutional controls restrict imports and foreign asset 
accumulation, and if the public sector expands its external borrowing. 
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exchange-rate regime the foreign currency windfall will induce a rise in both 
nominal and real exchange rates, but not necessarily in the money supply. 
The positive terms-of-trade shock is likely to influence government revenues 
and expenditures. The boom will give rise to a temporary increase in revenues 
through growth of the revenue base, with substantial effects if revenue is heavily 
reliant upon trade taxes and if the foreign-exchange inflow facilitates a large rise 
in imports. Discretionary tax increases may also be levied on incomes or on the 
exports from the booming tradeables sector. Because of political and social 
pressures, revenue increases are likely to lead to an expansion of public 
expenditure. The commodity boom of the 1970s provided the opportunity for 
substantial increases in public expenditure in all but a few SSA countries 
(Bevan et al., 1990; Wetzel, 1992; Bevan et al., 1992; Hanigan, 1991; Little et 
al., 1993; Alpine and Pickett 1993).5 Enhanced access to external capital 
markets or to domestic finance in the form of private savings accrued out of 
transient incomes may provide governments with further opportunities to finance 
higher levels of expenditure. Concentrating the growth in public sector 
investment into the construction boom years will further raise the price of 
non-traded capital goods, causing inflation and reducing the marginal efficiency 
of investment and the increase in permanent income derived from the transient 
income windfall. 
The increases in government revenues will probably not be sustainable once 
the boom has subsided. Government expenditures, for example on wages and 
subsidies, may prove politically much more difficult to reduce. It may not be 
possible to cut some categories of public expenditure such as debt servicing, and 
finance may have to be found for projects started during the boom. Unless the 
government can exercise considerable financial restraint it is therefore likely that 
the post-boom fiscal deficit will be larger than that prevailing before the boom. 
Inflationary pressure will also arise from expenditure changes because of 
increased demand for non-traded goods, in particular non-traded capital goods. 
Inflation will be exacerbated to the extent that private savers are prevented from 
holding financial assets (in lieu of purchasing domestic fixed assets), if 
expansionary fiscal policies are pursued and if restrictive trade policies limit the 
extent to which the increased demand can be channelled into higher levels of 
imports. 
Another legacy of the boom is likely to be a balance-of-payments deficit, 
which will arise for several reasons. First, the boom may induce unsustainable 
increases in aggregate demand, particularly if public expenditure expands. The 
external counterpart of excess demand in the traded goods sector will be a trade 
deficit. Secondly, domestic inflation during and after the boom and/or nominal 
5. Public expenditure in SSA increased from 19% of GDP in 1970 to 29% in 1980, with civil 
service employment and state enterprise investment in particular benefitting from the higher 
expenditures (Nashashibi and Bazzoni, 1993: 78). 
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exchange-rate appreciation will induce an appreciation in the real exchange rate, 
which will damage the competitiveness of the non-booming traded goods sector 
and increase import demand. Thirdly, external debt-servicing requirements may 
increase as a result of foreign debt contracted during the boom. Fourthly, 
changes in the production structure during the boom may increase the import 
intensity of the economy. This might arise because real exchange-rate 
appreciation induces a reallocation of investment towards sectors which are 
more import-intensive, such as protected import-substituting industry, at the 
expense of labour- and natural resource-intensive sectors such as agriculture. 
Analysis of commodity price booms affecting SSA countries in the 1970s, for 
example Kenya and Tanzania (Bevan et al., 1990); Ghana (Wetzel, 1992); 
Nigeria (Bevan et al., 1992); Malawi (Harrigan, 1991); Cameroon (Little et al., 
1993) and CBte d’Ivoire (Alpine and Pickett, 1993) indicates that in most cases 
the appropriate policy reforms for managing the booms were not implemented. 
Fixed investment, including public sector investment, was excessively 
concentrated in the construction boom period, public expenditure rose rapidly, 
and governments undertook increased external borrowing. The efficiency of 
much of this public sector investment was low. Government controls in many 
countries inhibited deferral of private sector investment through financial asset 
accumulation and prevented factor mobility in response to the construction 
boom. Most countries also encountered severe balance-of-payments deficits once 
the boom had ended, with inflation and exchange-rate appreciation eroding the 
competitiveness of the export sector. 
Policy implications 
Commodity price booms require careful economic management to ensure that 
the resources generated by the improvement in the terms of trade are utilised 
efficiently and that the boom does not undermine macroeconomic stability and 
the competitiveness of the traded goods sectors. The analysis points to a range 
of policy implications which can be related to three general objectives: first, 
reducing the vulnerability of the domestic economy to trade shocks; second, 
enhancing the efficiency with which boom incomes are utilised; and third, 
ensuring that the fiscal and monetary stance maintains macroeconomic stability. 
The structure of SSA economies implies that some degree of vulnerability to 
instability in international commodity markets is inevitable. This can be 
mitigated through commodity supply management policies (Bacon et al., 1996). 
export diversification (Kirkpatrick and Weiss, 1995) and broadening the 
government revenue base, for example by reducing dependence on trade taxes 
and emphasising revenue mobilisation from more widely based domestic 
consumption taxes such as value added taxes (Shalizi and Squire, 1988). 
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A number of policy reforms are pertinent to ensuring that the transient 
income accruing from the boom is allocated efficiently. The real rates of return 
on both domestic and foreign financial assets should be attractive so as to 
prevent fixed investment being concentrated into the trade boom years. In 
economies characterised by financial repression, this would entail policies to 
liberalise domestic interest rates and to improve access to 
foreign-exchange-denominated assets (such as foreign-currency bank accounts). 
It should be noted that this combination of domestic financial market 
liberalisation and liberalisation of the capital account of the balance of payments 
has contributed to serious macroeconomic instability in a number of 
middle-income developing countries in Latin America (McKinnon, 1988; 
Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990). This suggests that policy reform needs to be 
carefully sequenced, with domestic financial market liberalisation being 
consolidated before opening up the balance-of-payments capital account. In 
financially underdeveloped SSA the most feasible policy is likely to be an 
increase in nominal rates of interest to levels which ensure positive real rates 
of return to financial savings. The liberalisation of imports should also enhance 
the efficiency of resource allocation. 
In terms of intersectoral factor mobility, the removal of sector-specific 
ceilings on bank lending, sectoral foreign-exchange allocations and the 
liberalising of industrial and investment licensing requirements should allow a 
more flexible movement of resources in response to changing patterns of 
demand and thus raise the price elasticity of the supply of non-traded capital 
goods, which may also be impeded by monopolistic control in the production 
andor distribution of essential inputs such as cement. Measures to liberalise 
these markets are therefore likely to enhance supply elasticities. 
In order to avoid a long-run increase in the fiscal deficit, the increase in 
public expenditure during the boom should be limited to any rise in permanent 
income accruing to the government, i.e. the sustainable increase in revenues 
which could be generated by investing windfall tax receipts. This would imply 
an increase in public sector saving and a fall in the government deficit during 
a temporary boom when current revenues exceed permanent income. This would 
help to dampen the rise in relative non-traded capital goods prices and therefore 
the reduction in rates of return arising from the private sector investment boom, 
and would also serve to limit the overall increase in aggregate demand and the 
rate of money-supply growth. 
The importance of protecting and promoting foreign-exchange-earning 
industries in SSA countries would suggest that monetary and exchange-rate 
policy should be primarily directed towards minimising the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. Under a fixed exchange-rate regime, a real appreciation 
requires domestic inflation (at rates higher than those of the country’s trading 
partners) and an expansion of the money supply. To prevent this, monetary 
policy has to be used to sterilise the increase in the money supply brought about 
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by balance-of-payments surpluses. Under a market-determined regime, the 
excess foreign exchange accrued during the boom will induce a nominal 
exchange-rate appreciation, which the Central Bank could prevent by means of 
a policy of accumulating foreign-exchange reserves. This would lead to 
increases in the monetary base as the counterpart to the purchases of foreign 
currency, however, and the maintenance of real exchange-rate stability is likely 
to require the sterilisation of these monetary injections in a similar manner to 
that entailed under a fixed-rate regime. 
Table 1 summarises the various policies which should facilitate the 
appropriate management of a trade boom. 
Table 1 
Policy reforms applicable to the management of positive commodity price shocks 
Objectives Policies 
Reducing vulnerability Commodity supply management 
to trade shocks Broadening government revenue base, e.g. introduction 
of VAT 
Export diversification strategy 
Raise deposit interest rates to positive real levels and/or 
liberalise interest rates 
Import liberalisation sustainable with other components 
of policy stance 
Removal of sectoral credit and foreign-exchange 
allocations 
Liberalisation of industrial and investment licensing 
requirements 
Removal of monopolies in the production andor supply 
of non-traded capital goods inputs (e.g. cement). 
Restraint on public investment during commodity price 
boom so as to avoid crowding out private investment 
Promoting efficient 
allocation of transient 
income 
Maintenance of 
macroeconomic 
stability 
Tight control on government expenditures and 
borrowing. Public savings should rise during commodity 
price booms and fiscal policy should be countercyclical 
Sterilisation of monetary base increases arising from 
BOP surpluses 
Prevention of real exchange-rate appreciation through 
restraint of aggregate demand growth and inflation 
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Developments in world commodity markets during 1994 were the most 
favourable for many of the non-oil exporters of SSA since the late 1970% with 
sharp rises in the prices of coffee, cocoa and copper. In the intervening period 
most SSA countries have undertaken World Bank-sponsored  SAPS.^ This raises 
the key question of whether the reforms introduced by these programmes have 
left the region in a better position to manage the commodity price booms of the 
1990s such that the transient income windfall can be converted into a permanent 
income gain. Their efficacy can be discussed from three standpoints: whether 
they have reduced the vulnerability of SSA countries to trade shocks through 
trade and government tax-base diversification; whether they will enable export 
boom income to be saved and invested in a more efficient manner; and whether 
they can ensure that the boom does not exacerbate macroeconomic instabilities. 
Although the SAP reforms were primarily intended to address the problems 
of long-term domestic policy deficiencies (Toye, 1994; World Bank, 1981) and 
those caused by permanent changes in the external economic environment 
(Mosley et al., 1991, Vol. 1: 23), they are not necessarily incompatible with the 
measures required to enhance the management of commodity booms. In order 
to ascertain the degree of compatibility, the reforms implemented in a 
multi-country sample of SAPs in SSA (World Bank, 1994; Mosley et al., 1991; 
and Mosley, 1994) can be compared with the policy prescriptions summarised 
in Table 1. 
Structural adjustment and diversijication 
In SSA export diversification is likely to consist of expanding the production of 
non-traditional commodities, processed or manufactured goods, and, for some 
countries, services such as tourism. Within the context of SAPs, the main policy 
mechanisms have been trade and exchange-rate reforms designed to increase 
incentives for exports of all kinds. These have been accompanied in several 
SSA countries by additional incentives aimed at non-traditional exports, 
including the provision of export earnings retention schemes, duty drawbacks, 
Export Processing Zones, and various fiscal incentives (World Bank, 1994: 
75-6). The benefits of these policies appear to have been confined largely to the 
traditional primary commodities such as cocoa, coffee and sugar (Stewart, 1994: 
107). As yet there is little evidence to indicate that much more than very limited 
6. By 1992 a total of 38 SSA countries had implemented either an economy-wide SAP andor 
sectoral adjustment programmes backed by financial support from the international financial 
institutions, with the World Bank providing $7. I billion. Structural adjustment has therefore 
become a dominant policy influence throughout the region. 
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Table 2 
Number of commodities exported and indices of export commodity concentration 
in SSA adjusters: 1980 and 1990 
Country 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
CGte d'Ivoire 
Gabon 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-B iseau 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
No. of commodities exported Commodity concentr. index 
I 980 
30 
43 
26 
90 
15 
15 
29 
154 
46 
23 
55 
23 
22 
143 
53 
47 
40 
24 
n.a. 
39 
147 
13 
113 
39 
83 
51 
22 
49 
87 
1990 
29 
23 
7 
103 
25 
17 
34 
106 
45 
22 
54 
28 
n.a. 
183 
70 
35 
41 
20 
44 
102 
16 
106 
16 
66 
47 
13 
33 
170 
I 980 
0.415 
0.476 
0.594 
0.409 
0.415 
0.794 
0.890 
0.383 
0.763 
0.4 18 
0.729 
0.905 
0.331 
0.383 
0.501 
0.490 
0.477 
0.661 
n.a. 
0.82 1 
0.948 
0.668 
0.27 I 
0.444 
0.286 
0.468 
0.950 
0.717 
0.257 
1990 
0.482 
0.48 I 
0.744 
0.31 1 
0.588 
0.688 
0.797 
0.345 
0.8 I2 
0.353 
0.450 
0.840 
n.a. 
0.239 
0.309 
0.656 
0.565 
0.621 
0.767 
0.959 
0.552 
0.25 1 
0.458 
0.250 
0.468 
0.868 
0.93 1 
0.245 
Notes: n.a.=not available. The number of commodities exported refers to products at the 
three digit SITC level, the value of which was greater than $50,000 in 1980 or $lOO,OOO 
in 1990 or was more than 0.3% of the country's total exports. The export concentration 
index is a Hirschmann index which takes values between 0 and 1. Higher values of the 
index denote a greater commodity concentration of exports: i.e., a single commodity or 
a few commodities account for a larger proportion of total exports. 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1992: 
2 4 1 4  
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progress has been achieved in boosting non-traditional exports (Kirkpatrick and 
Weiss, 1995). 
Table 2 provides some statistical data on the extent to which the 29 SSA 
countries implementing SAPs during the period 1987-91 covered in the World 
Bank (1994) study diversified their exports in the 1980s. Of the 27 countries for 
which data were available, 16 exported a smaller number of commodities in 
1990 than in 1980. Although a majority were able to reduce commodity 
concentration, the extent of the reduction was very limited. 
The emphasis placed by SAPs on price reforms to boost exports is likely to 
be of greater benefit to the traditional primary commodity exports than to 
non-traditional exports, since the latter often face other severe constraints, such 
as inadequate technological, managerial, technical and marketing skills and 
infrastructure, and lack of finance. Remedying these constraints has not been 
addressed in most SAPs in SSA. Hence the failure to achieve a significant 
degree of export diversification can be partly attributed to the policy 
composition of SAPs. 
Progress has been achieved in only a few SSA countries in diversifying the 
government's revenue base away from an excessive concentration on trade 
taxes. This has primarily involved the introduction of consumption taxes (such 
as value added tax) in countries such as Cameroon, Tanzania, Malawi, Mauritius 
and The Gambia, although practical difficulties have usually meant that the tax 
base has not been extended much beyond imports and domestically produced 
manufactured items (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, 1992).' 
SSA countries can reduce their vulnerability to terms-of-trade shocks through 
commodity supply management policies (Bacon et al., 1996). Their SAPs have 
ignored the issue of supply management, however, leaving it instead to 
international commodity agreements, despite the latter's lack of success. 
Furthermore, because of the fallacy of composition whereby advising a large 
number of SSA countries simultaneously to increase their output of a given 
commodity can lead to excess supply and declining world prices, SAPs have 
made supply management harder (Godfrey, 1985; Akiyama and Larson, 1993). 
Structural adjustment and eflciency of boom income savings and investment 
Central to the issue of whether SAPs have removed obstacles to efficient 
investment of boom income is the argument that administrative controls over the 
prices and distribution of fixed and financial assets and/or uncompetitive market 
structures are likely to impede optimal resource allocation by the private sector, 
7. The information in Mosley, 1994 (Appendix 6.1: 95-8) indicates that specific policy 
conditionality relating to tax reforms accompanied World Bank adjustment lending in only 5 
out of 23 countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi. Mauritius and Senegal). 
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depressing savings rates and channelling income into investments with low rates 
of return. We focus our assessment on reforms in five important areas: interest 
rates; imports; sectoral credit controls; investment licensing; and controls in 
non-traded capital goods markets. 
Financial markets have a crucial role to play in ensuring that rates of return 
to savings from boom income are maximised. Savers require attractive financial 
assets in which to hold their savings so that non-traded capital goods 
expenditures can be smoothed out beyond the end of the commodity boom. As 
bank deposits provide the main financial asset available to savers in most SSA 
countries, ensuring that bank deposits offer attractive rates of interest is 
essential. Interest-rate reforms have been an important feature of SAPs and real 
deposit rates have been increased in the majority of adjusting countries in SSA, 
for 21 of them from an average negative 4% during 19816 to 1.6% in 
1990-91, with 17 achieving an increase in the real deposit rate. Furthermore real 
deposit rates were positive in 15 of the 21 during 1990-91 compared with 12 in 
the earlier period. 
The efficiency of resource allocation during a commodity boom will be 
reduced if desired investments are impeded because import controls prevent 
investors from purchasing imported capital goods. SAPs have involved a 
reduction of import restrictions in the majority of adjusting countries in SSA, 
in part reflecting the importance attached by the World Bank to trade policy 
reform. Quantitative restrictions such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were 
imposed on a wide range of imports in 21 out of 23 adjusting countries prior 
to the implementation of the reforms. By 1992 only 2 still retained 
comprehensive quantitative restrictions. 
Controls on the allocation of foreign exchange have also been liberalised. Of 
14 countries which controlled access to all foreign exchange before 
implementing SAPs, 6 had removed almost all restrictions by 1992, while an 
additional 6 countries had removed controls on the allocation of 50% or more 
of available foreign exchange. 
Controls over the sectoral allocation of bank credit (the main source of 
finance for commercial enterprises in most SSA countries) may prevent savings 
from being channelled into the most productive investment projects. Formal 
administrative controls have usually taken the form of directives to banks to 
allocate a specified share of their loan portfolios to particular sectors or 
industries. Several SSA countries have implemented financial sector reform 
programmes which have included measures to liberalise credit controls and 
remove sectoral directives (Johnson, 1994). Ghana, for example, rescinded most 
sectoral directives in 1987 and had eliminated all by 1991. In Guinea and 
Madagascar, the banking system had been nationalised during the 1960s or 
1970s with credit allocated mainly according to non-commercial criteria. Private 
capital and management have now been reintroduced, and this should ensure 
that commercial criteria play a more prominent role in credit allocation. 
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The administrative regulation and licensing of investment and industry almost 
inevitably discourages investment or diverts it into less productive projects. 
Many of the adjusting countries have liberalised investment regulations since 
adopting SAPs, often as part of a package of incentives aimed at attracting a 
greater level of private sector investment. 
Monopolies in non-traded capital goods markets are likely to impede efforts 
to invest boom income efficiently. Monopoly controls may prevent the optimal 
supply response to the increase in demand during a trade boom. Because of 
economies of scale and government intervention, the cement industry, the key 
input to the building industry, has been characterised by widespread market 
concentration in SSA. Monopoly controls over cement production and 
distribution have been reduced in only a few of the SSA countries undertaking 
SAPs. Of 19 adjusting countries, 15 had monopolies in markets for domestic 
cement production prior to the implementation of SAPs. By late 1992 the 
number with competitive cement markets had increased to only 7; 7 countries 
retained public sector monopolies, while private sector monopolies prevailed in 
5 .  
Improving the macroeconomic management of trade booms 
The assessment as to whether SAPs have enhanced the capacity to manage the 
macroeconomy during a trade boom is based on two aspects of the 
implementation of the reforms. First, we examine whether macroeconomic 
performance in the non-boom periods has improved: reduced fiscal deficits, 
lower inflation and more realistic exchange rates could be taken as evidence that 
the capacity to manage the macroeconomy has improved and therefore that any 
subsequent commodity boom will also be better managed. Secondly, we 
examine whether a number of technical changes affecting macroeconomic policy 
instruments are likely to have enhanced the capacity for more appropriate 
macroeconomic management during a commodity boom: these include public 
expenditure and investment controls; monetary policy operating techniques; and 
methods of exchange-rate determination. 
The World Bank (1994, Chapter 2 and Appendix B) claims that some 
improvements in macroeconomic policies have been attained, although none of 
the countries surveyed has what it regards as a ‘good’ overall macroeconomic 
stance.* The fiscal position in SSA had been characterised by very large deficits 
in the first half of the 1980s. The adjusting countries attained on average only 
a small reduction from 6.4% of GDP during 1981-6 to 5.2% during 1990-91. 
8. The overall macroeconomic stance was evaluated by combining data on the fiscal deficit, 
seigniorage, inflation and real interest rates, and the parallel market exchange-rate premium 
or change in the real effective exchange rate. 
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Monetary policy was regarded by the World Bank as reasonably satisfactory, 
with inflation falling from a median of 10.6% in 1981-6 to 8% in 1990-91. 
SSA countries required real exchange-rate devaluations in the 1980s for two 
reasons; rates had become overvalued due to high rates of domestic inflation 
combined with fixed nominal exchange rates, while the long-term downturn in 
the external terms of trade also required a depreciation of the exchange rate to 
restore external competitiveness. Progress has been made by the SSA countries 
in lowering real exchange rates and reducing parallel market exchange-rate 
premiums; 12 out of 15 non-CFA zone countries achieved a median real 
depreciation of 64% between 1980 and 199&1 (World Bank, 1994: 45-57). 
The World Bank study (1994: 124-6) indicates that, although efforts to 
improve budgetary procedures have been made in most adjusting countries, 
progress appears to have been limited. By 1992 only a minority of countries had 
established effective systems for monitoring and controlling payrolls and 
investment projects. Of 29 adjusting countries, only 6 were regarded as having 
systems which were free of significant problems, while 18 had failed to 
introduce systems for monitoring all public sector investment projects. 
Monetary policy reforms enacted as part of SAPs in a number of SSA 
countries have involved measures to introduce market-based policy instruments 
in place of direct controls such as bank-specific lending ceilings and regulated 
interest rates. Essentially this required the Central Bank to intervene by 
purchasing foreign exchange (and therefore accumulating foreign reserves) and 
to sterilise the induced injections into the money supply using the available 
market-based monetary policy instruments. The main ones have been primary 
issues of government or Central Bank securities in combination with rediscount 
facilities: these have been referred to as ‘open market type operations’ (Johnston 
and Brekk, 1991: 97). Countries which have introduced monetary policy 
instruments of this type include Ghana, Kenya and Malawi. Part of the 
underlying rationale is that these market-based systems of monetary control 
offer the authorities potentially more effective and flexible instruments for 
controlling monetary aggregates (ibid., 1991: 98-9). However, their efficacy in 
the context of SSA economies is also potentially problematic. Because of the 
shallow nature of their financial markets (and in particular markets for 
securities), using open-market type operations to target a monetary aggregate 
might lead to excessive interest-rate volatility. It also imposes much greater 
demands on the Central Bank in terms of operational requirements for collating 
and using information, and forecasting (Roe, 1991: 18). Central Banks will 
therefore need time to develop the relevant expertise. As a consequence, the 
change in operating techniques may in the short term introduce considerable 
uncertainty into the financial markets, making effective monetary management 
more difficult. 
Many SSA countries undertaking SAPs in recent years have begun to 
introduce market-determined exchange-rate systems. Countries which have 
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introduced ‘floating’ exchange rates include Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, 
Tanzania and Kenya. Reforms of this nature have generally entailed two major 
components: the liberalisation of access to foreign exchange and a system for 
trading foreign exchange, e.g. regular auctions andor the development of 
interbank foreign-exchange markets (Mistry, 1994: 122). One of the concerns 
expressed about the adoption of floating exchange rates is that they may lead 
to excessive nominal exchange-rate volatility in response to large or unexpected 
shifts in the supply of, or demand for, foreign exchange. The optimal policy 
during a commodity boom is likely to involve intervention by the Central Bank, 
which in the context of a liberalised foreign-exchange market will necessitate 
purchasing foreign exchange from the market: ie the Central Bank will have to 
attempt a managed float. As with the move towards market-based systems of 
monetary control, this type of exchange-rate management is likely to impose 
substantial requirements in terms of operating expertise on Central Banks. In the 
short term they may lack the requisite experience and capacities to intervene 
effectively and as a consequence exchange-rate management in the face of 
shocks such as commodity booms may become more difficult. 
Conclusions 
The experience of the 1970s export commodity price booms in SSA indicated 
that many of the countries in the region had economic policy regimes which 
prevented them from deriving maximum benefits from temporary windfalls of 
foreign exchange. Instead, most of these countries found themselves facing 
severe macroeconomic imbalances once the boom had ended. Since the last 
major commodity boom in the 1970s, most SSA countries have undertaken 
comprehensive programmes of economic policy reform. Table 3 summarises the 
extent to which SAP reforms have improved SSA’s capacity to manage 
commodity booms. 
The SSA countries appear to have achieved very little export diversification 
since adopting SAPs, and as a consequence remain heavily reliant on a few 
primary commodities for the bulk of their export earnings. In part this reflects 
the policy composition of SAPs; exchange-rate and agricultural price and 
marketing reforms have mainly been of benefit to traditional exports, while 
insufficient emphasis has been placed on the specific policy measures needed 
to promote the development of non-traditional exports. In only a handful of 
countries have reforms included measures to diversify the government’s revenue 
base, principally through the introduction of consumption taxes as an alternative 
to trade taxes. Because of the fallacy of composition, SAPs have made 
successful implementation of commodity supply management policies more 
difficult. 
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Table 3 
The extent to which SAP reforms have improved capacity to manage commodity 
price booms 
Objective SAP progress 
1. Diversification 
a. Exportbase a. Minimal progress 
b. Tax base 
c. Commodity supply management countries 
2. Savings and investment efllciency 
b. Progress in only a handful of 
c. Made harder 
a. Raising real deposit interest rate a. Substantial progress 
b. Removing NTBs b. Substantial progress 
c. De-control on foreign-exchange allocation c. Substantial progress 
d. Liberalising cement production d. Minimal progress 
e. De-controlling credit allocation e. Progress in some countries 
f. Liberalising investment licensing f. Progress in some countries 
3. Macro-policy management 
a. General macro-policy stance a. Moderate improvement 
b. Controlling public expenditure b. Little progress 
c. Monetary policy conduct c. Made harder in the short term 
d. Exchange-rate management d. Made harder in the short term 
Mechanisms for efficiently mobilising and allocating savings and investment 
are crucial if the transient income accruing from a commodity boom is to 
produce maximum benefits in terms of enhancing permanent income gains. The 
construction boom analysis discussed in this article indicated that the extensive 
control regimes imposed on SSA economies (especially financial repression, and 
import and price controls) led to a sub-optimal use of boom income. Excessive 
levels of investment, concentrated in a short time period, in non-traded capital 
goods, pushed up the price of these goods and led to a decline in rates of return. 
The liberalising strategy entailed in SAPS has significantly reduced the extent 
of the control regime in SSA countries. Real interest rates have been raised to 
positive levels in most adjusting countries, offering savers an alternative savings 
outlet to the purchase of fixed assets. Import restrictions have been liberalised. 
with substantial reductions in the extent to which imports are subject to 
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non-tariff barriers. Controls on the sectoral allocation of bank credit have been 
removed in a number of countries and investment licensing procedures have 
been liberalised. Rather less progress has been made in eliminating monopolies 
in the production of inputs into non-traded capital goods, such as cement. 
As a consequence, SAPs have almost certainly moved SSA economies 
towards a policy regime which is more conducive to saving and investing boom 
income efficiently. Nevertheless, a number of obstacles to the optimal allocation 
of savings and investment undoubtedly remain, not only in terms of 
administrative controls but also arising from market failures in other areas, in 
particular in the financial system. Adjusting countries in SSA have made 
moderate improvements in macroeconomic policy during the non-boom period 
since the mid-l980s, although this does not necessarily ensure that current and 
future commodity booms will be appropriately managed. Various technical 
reforms under way in adjusting countries, which are likely to enhance 
macroeconomic management capabilities, included measures to improve public 
expenditure control, monetary policy and exchange-rate determination. Although 
restraining the growth of public expenditures is crucial to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability during a trade boom, effective systems for controlling 
public employment and investment projects have not yet been put in place in the 
majority of SSA countries. Institutional reforms in the conduct of monetary 
policy and exchange-rate determination are intended to strengthen 
macroeconomic management in the long term, but in the short term may involve 
a period of greater uncertainty as the necessary experience and expertise are 
acquired by the authorities and by market participants. 
The primary rationale for SAPs in SSA has been to address longer-term 
economic problems rather than those arising from cyclical factors such as 
commodity booms. Nevertheless, the policy reforms are likely to have brought 
about some benefits for SSA countries in terms of their ability to manage 
commodity price booms. The failure to diversify the export base, however, 
means that the need for an appropriate domestic policy regime and policy 
responses to commodity price booms remains as great now as it was during the 
1970s. Clearly there is still scope for future SAPs to introduce reforms which 
would improve countries’ ability to manage commodity price shocks. 
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